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ABSTRACT
The regulation of animals falls into three main paradigms; animal health, animal wel-
fare and conservation. This article argues that in the modern context there are several
regulatory challenges which are not accommodated within those parameters including
those presented by contemporary issues such as animal diseases and hybrid and feral
animals. A case study of honeybees is used to explore these frameworks and their par-
ameters and limitations in detail. The difﬁculties arising are not conﬁned to idiosyn-
cratic cases such as honeybees however, but also apply at a broader level. While some
of these difﬁculties might be tackled through incremental changes to existing legisla-
tion, a more holistic framework which moves beyond historical assumptions about the
nature of animals and their relationship with people therefore, will ultimately be
needed.
KEYWORDS : animals, wildlife, conservation, animal health, animal welfare
1. INTRODUCTION
The way that animals are categorised and conceptualised within legal frameworks
has implications for the responsibilities and protections offered to them. Currently
regulatory responses fall into three prevailing paradigms: animal health, animal wel-
fare, and conservation, but these paradigms do not adequately accommodate the
complexities of contemporary regulatory challenges. This applies not only in idiosyn-
cratic cases, but also for wider issues including significant, emerging challenges —
notably here the question of diseases in wild animals. This article aims to identify
and analyse the prevailing regulatory paradigms, considering their boundaries and
legal assumptions, to assess how these limit the ability of these frameworks to offer
reflexive and effective responses to given regulatory objectives and challenges and to
consider the implications of these and possible ways forward.
Section 2 addresses the nature and content of the three prevailing regulatory para-
digms: animal health, animal welfare, and conservation, unpicking their historical de-
velopment and the consequent parameters of each. Section 2 also offers a brief
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introduction to the main legislative arrangements currently in place within each of
the three paradigms, emphasising key provisions and concepts. In Section 3 the case
study of honeybees is developed in detail. First the problem and implications of
declining honeybee populations is described, with specific focus on the impact of
pests and diseases—a key concern for honeybee populations. This is followed by
analysis of the applicability of each of the paradigms to this issue. The analysis draws
out the complex categorisation issues and assumptions about the differing roles of
animals—here specifically honeybees—and the regulatory spaces that they may oc-
cupy. In doing so, this Section makes clear that none of the existing paradigms fits
comfortably onto the honeybee problem. Section 4 builds on and broadens the ana-
lysis to consider how the underlying limitations in each of the three paradigms re-
strict the applicability of otherwise relevant measures not only to honeybees, but also
to other animals and species and to consider the deeper conceptual problems in the
distinctions made within the law. Finally, the article considers some of the changes
which might begin to shift the law towards more effective ways of conceptualising
and regulating animals. Responding to current limitations will involve moving be-
yond traditional parameters. Emerging issues call for a more holistic approach to ani-
mals in the law and even where narrower anthropocentric concerns are the focus of
regulation, the distinctions traditionally made are not tenable. Extending the param-
eters of existing frameworks offers some opportunities to address current limitations,
but may not go far enough in overcoming conceptual problems and correspondingly
inflexible frameworks.
2 . CURRENT PARADIGMS FOR ANIMALS AND THE LAW
2.1 Animal health
‘Animal health’ is the regulatory framework within which pests and diseases are man-
aged and focuses on animals kept for agricultural purposes—commonly, ‘livestock’
or ‘farmed animals’. In responding to pest and disease risks, the animal health frame-
work makes a number of distinctions between different types of animals and the cir-
cumstances in which disease controls will apply. The historical development of the
animal health framework provides the basis for these distinctions: animal health has
been concerned with protecting livestock producers and other keepers of economic-
ally important animals from the losses associated with disease outbreaks and this re-
mains the focus of animal health.1 Early efforts in animal health responded to
particular disease outbreaks. The veterinary health service was introduced in re-
sponse to an outbreak of rinderplast, and movement restrictions and powers to order
the destruction of infected animals were introduced under the Cattle Diseases Act
1866 which expanded on provisions of the Sheep Pox Acts of 1848.2 Animal health
1 See further John McEldowney, Wyn Grant and Graham Medley, The Regulation of Animal Health and
Welfare: Science, Law and Policy (Routledge 2013); David Carslake and others, ‘Animal Health and Welfare :
A Case Study of Science, Law And Policy in a Regulatory Environment’ (2010) 3 Law, Society and Policy
227.
2 Clive Spinage, Cattle Plague: A History (Kluwer/Plenum 2003); Abigail Woods, A Manufactured Plague:
The History of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Britain (Earthscan 2004); Abigail Woods, ‘The Construction of
Animal Plague: Foot and Mouth Disease in Nineteenth-century Britain’ (2004) 17 Social History of
Medicine 3.
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efforts at this time predated the current understanding of diseases and their epidemi-
ology and of veterinary medicine,3 but killing infected animals or preventing their
entry into the country was successful in controlling disease outbreaks.4 The animal
health framework was therefore reactive, with legislation for particular diseases intro-
duced usually as a consequence of an outbreak of that disease and in response to
public health crises.5
The existing animal health framework is notable for its multitude of legislative in-
struments, both domestic and EU, with legislation often species and disease specific.6
The key enabling Act for England and Wales is the Animal Health Act 1981 but this
is implemented by dozens of pieces of secondary legislation and further Acts.7
Within this framework, livestock animals are routinely subject to mandatory controls
and these tend to be based around a system of compulsory registration, movement
controls, and surveillance designed to minimise the risk of diseases being spread and
to ensure traceability in the event that there is a disease outbreak.8
Registration of the animals themselves or their keepers enables the regulatory au-
thority to maintain an up-to-date and accurate picture of their presence which can be
used to support activities in disease surveillance, enforcement and education.
3 Jeff Waage and John Mumford, ‘Agricultural Biosecurity’ (2008) 363 Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society 863.
4 Carslake and others (n 1).
5 Opi Outhwaite, ‘Legal Frameworks for Biosecurity’ in Andrew Dobson, Kezia Barker and Sarah Taylor
(eds), Biosecurity: Theory and Politics in Practice (Routledge/Earthscan 2013). See also Mike Radford,
Animal Welfare Law in Britain; Regulation and Responsibility (OUP 2001).
6 Animal health is an area of shared competence so while many instruments give effect to EU law there are
also many which address specific issues of domestic importance or which provide for further matters—this
is most clearly the case for bovine tuberculosis. For a comprehensive review of animal health legislation
see Opi Outhwaite, ‘Obligations and Flexibilities in Animal Health Legislation’ (unpublished Defra April
2013).
7 Including the Animal Health Act 2002 which makes particular provision for responses to Foot and Mouth
Disease and transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs).
8 With an emphasis on cattle for example, see: Disease Control (England) Order 2003, SI 2003/1729 [as
amended]; Cattle Identification Regulations 2007, SI 2007/529 [as amended]; Regulation EC 1760/2000
establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of
beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97; Movement of Animals
(Restrictions) (England) Order 2002, SI 2002/3229; Council Directive 2000/75/EC of 20 November
2000 laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue; Commission
Regulation (EC) No 1266/2007 of 26 October 2007 on implementing rules for Council Directive 2000/
75/EC as regards the control, monitoring, surveillance and restrictions on movements of certain animals
of susceptible species in relation to bluetongue [2007] OJ L287/37; Zoonoses (Monitoring) (England)
Regulations 2007, SI 2007/2399; Zoonoses Order 1989, SI 1989/285; Products of Animal Origin
(Disease Control) (England) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/465; The Products of Animal Origin (Disease
Control) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/1297; Enzootic Bovine Leukosis Order
2000, SI 2000/2056; Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (England) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/
801; Bovine Semen (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/254; The Animal By-Products
(Enforcement) (England) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/2952. This is not a complete list: see Outhwaite (n
6). For an overview of guidance see, for cattle: <https://www.gov.uk/topic/keeping-farmed-animals/cat
tle-identity-registration>, <https://www.gov.uk/topic/keeping-farmed-animals/cattle-movement>; for
pigs: <https://www.gov.uk/topic/keeping-farmed-animals/pig-identity-registration-movements>; for
sheep: <https://www.gov.uk/topic/keeping-farmed-animals/sheep-identity-registration>; for poultry:
<https://www.gov.uk/topic/keeping-farmed-animals/poultry-registration> (all links accessed 18 January
2017).
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Movement controls, designed to prevent the movement of infected animals (and
contaminated equipment) from one place to another can include record-keeping,
permitting requirements for movements in normal (disease free) circumstances and
the imposition of movement restrictions in the event that disease is identified or sus-
pected. Treatment or destruction of animals will also be provided for in the event of
confirmed or suspected disease presence and in many cases is supported with a sys-
tem of compensation. In addition to these ‘in country’ controls there are several pro-
visions applicable to the trade in animals and animal products, both within the EU
and between the EU and third countries which aim to prevent the arrival of diseases
into the EU and also therefore into the UK.9
2.2 Animal welfare
While animal health is focused on economically important livestock animals, early ef-
forts to protect animals from cruelty related only to domesticated animals10 and this
focus is largely reflected in the continuing parameters of the animal welfare frame-
work. Prevailing moral and social values—which will be time and context specific—
are noted by Harrop to be an important influence on the development of animal wel-
fare.11 ‘Animals’—encompassing companion animals, livestock and other ‘kept’ ani-
mals – have historically been considered as property, with early cruelty offences
seeking to protect not the welfare of animals but the interests of property owners (as
well as seeking to preserve public order).12 While this at an early stage limited the
development of animal welfare, it perhaps also enabled the development of a view
that animals, because they were subject to human control, should be protected from
cruelty and subject to certain protections, with human keepers or owners placed in a
guardianship role.13 Robertson notes, for example that:
Essentially, the law reflects a scale of ‘responsibility’ regarding animals, depend-
ing on their uses, and reliance on human care-givers. For example, there are
legal obligations regarding companion animals which largely reflect the law’s
approach that if an animal is significantly dependent on a human being for its
food, water, shelter, health and overall well-being, then it is appropriate to
apply equally significant legal accountabilities to the caregiver. Similarly, if soci-
ety wishes to benefit from animals (eg, in agriculture or research), then people
justifiably have a greater duty of care to those animals in comparison to those
that exist in the wild.14
This position means that while animal welfare has progressed steadily to offer more
comprehensive protection over time, wild animals, by contrast, have been viewed as
9 See <http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/index_en.htm> accessed 18 January 2017.
10 Radford (n 5) 77.
11 Stuart R Harrop,‘The Dynamics of Wild Animal Welfare Law’ (1997) 9(2) JEL 287.
12 See, for example, discussion by Ian Robertson, Animals, Welfare and the Law: Fundamental Principles for
Critical Assessment (Routledge 2015); McEldowney and others (n 1).
13 Peter Fitzgerald, ‘Good Badger Bad Badger: The Impact of Perspective on Wildlife Law and Policy’
(2013) 10 J of Animal & Natural Resource L 41; Robertson (n 12).
14 Robertson (n 12) ch 5.
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separate and treated as something to be controlled (where necessary, for example
through hunting or pest control) or as a resource to be exploited or managed
(including for leisure).15 Although the law does, in some limited circumstances, pro-
tect wild animals from suffering, there is no overarching acceptance within the law
that wild animals can and do suffer nor that they should be protected from suffer-
ing.16 Harrop argues that such legal protection of wild animals as does exist is largely
incidental, resulting from measures with conservation aims17 and while some specific
offences apply to wild animals (see below) these are restrictively drawn in terms of
both scope and species coverage.
The current framework for animal welfare extends beyond specific offences of
cruelty to protect animal welfare more broadly and to minimise or prevent suffering
in animals. Typically, this framework addresses domesticated animals including com-
panion animals (pets) with some separate measures specifically applicable to the con-
ditions in which farm animals are kept.18
At the EU level several instruments establish minimum standards for the protec-
tion of farmed animals on a species specific basis;19 there is no overarching EU
framework on the welfare of pets.20 Domestically however, the legal framework takes
a more encompassing approach to animal welfare and includes companion animals
as a central focus of the legislation. In England and Wales, the Animal Welfare Act
2006 (the AWA 2006) is the principal legislation for animal welfare and places a
broad duty on persons responsible for an animal(s) to ensure the welfare of that
15 Law Commission, Wildlife Law (Consultation Paper No 206, 2012); Gareth Spark, ‘Protecting Wild
Animals from Unnecessary Suffering’ (2014) 26 JEL 473; Fitzgerald (n 13); Joan E Schaffner, An
Introduction to Animals and the Law (Palsgrave Macmillan 2011).
16 Spark (n 15) and see the Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996.
17 Stuart Harrop, ‘The Dynamics of Wild Animal Welfare Law’ (1997) 9 JEL 287; Radford (n 5).
Conversely, it has also been argued that species specific conservation measures arose principally from ani-
mal welfare efforts. (McEldowney, Grant and Medley (n 1); this view is perhaps better understood with a
view to the idiosyncratic protection offered to some species, such as badgers and deer.
18 In addition to the 2006 Act the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations, SI 2007/2078 (as
amended) establish further conditions on the keeping of farmed animals with specific conditions for
hens, calves, pigs and rabbits. This regulation gives effect to several applicable pieces of EU legislation on
farm animal welfare. In some specific but much more limited instances wild animals are protected
through cruelty offences but are not subject to wider animal welfare measures.
19 Typically these establish minimum space requirements, maximum stock density and some requirements
concerning feeding and treatment in the event of injury or illness, with separate measures providing for
welfare during transport. See Council Directive 1999/74/EC laying down minimum standards for the
protection of laying hens [1999] OJ L203/53; Council Directive 2007/43/EC laying down minimum
rules for the production of chickens kept for meat production [2007] OJ L182/19; Council Directive
2008/119/EC laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves [2009] OJ L10/7; Council
Directive 2001/88/EC amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying down minimum standards for the protec-
tion of pigs [2001] OJ L316/4; Council Directive 2001/93/EC amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying
down minimum standards for the protection of pigs [2001] OJ L316/36.
20 Though Art 13 of Treaty of the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides ‘In formulating
and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological
development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient
beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or adminis-
trative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural trad-
itions and regional heritage’.
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animal.21 That duty means taking reasonable steps to meet the animal’s needs includ-
ing (1) its need for a suitable environment, (2) its need for a suitable diet, (3) its
need to be able to exhibit normal behaviour patterns, (4) any need it has to be
housed with, or apart from, other animals, and (5) its need to be protected from
pain, suffering, injury and disease.22 Failure to fulfil the duty constitutes an offence
but where a person is failing in their duty, improvement notices can be issued by an
inspector, specifying steps to be taken to achieve compliance.23 In addition, the Act
establishes further offences including an offence of causing unnecessary suffering.24
A crucial component of the AWA is the assumption of sentience in order for animal
welfare provisions to apply. ‘Animals’ for the purpose of the AWA 2006 means ‘ver-
tebrates other than man’25 and it is only this category of animals that are assumed to
meet the sentience requirement.26
2.3 Conservation
In the framework of conservation, the objects of regulation are wild animals.
Conservation laws, like animal health, developed from a reactive position, addressing
specific issues as they were identified.27 They also focused on the need to conserve
species in terms of utility and the avoidance of over-exploitation (from an anthropo-
centric perspective) and on cruelty offences that related to this utility. As noted by
Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen, protection of individual animals is largely done on
an ad hoc basis28 and protection of wild animals from a conservation perspective is
by no means comprehensive. Similarly to animal welfare, there has been no overarch-
ing assumption that animal species should be protected.
Conservation laws, in their early development, also maintained boundaries from
agriculture, land management, and private property rights and from amenity and cul-
tural value.29 While more integrated approaches to land use (seeking to reconcile
agricultural and environmental needs) have since developed such distinctions are still
to be observed in current conservation legislation and, as they apply to wild animals,
further reflect the assumption that the conservation of species is to fit in with the re-
source needs of humans or assumptions about the animals utility.
The current legal framework addresses both individual species and habitat conser-
vation. Whereas animal welfare is concerned with the condition of animals at an indi-
vidual level, the framework for conservation focuses on population or species level
protection and in this regard seeks to protect animals which are considered threat-
ened or are otherwise prioritised. As with the other frameworks, conservation is an
21 The AWA 2006 s 9(1).
22 ibid s 9: duty of person responsible for animal to ensure welfare.
23 ibid s 10.
24 ibid s 4. See further offences in ss 5–8.
25 ibid s 1(1).
26 ibid, Note 11, Explanatory Note.
27 Stuart Bell, Donald McGillivray and Ole Pedersen (eds), Environmental Law (8th edn, OUP 2013) at
801; Colin Reid, Nature Conservation Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) ch 3.
28 Bell, McGillivray, and Pedersen, ibid 803. And see Law Commission, Wildlife Law Final Report, Volume 1,
(Law Com No 362 2015) ch 1.
29 Bell, McGillivray, and Pedersen (n 27). See also Reid (n 27) on the [lack of] ownership of wild animals:
18–19.
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area in which the domestic legislative framework gives effect to a number of instru-
ments at EU level including the Habitats Directive30 and the Birds Directive.31 In
addition, some wild animals are afforded protection at the domestic level through
species specific legislation or other ad hoc measures (for instance, the Protection of
Badgers Act 1992 and the Deer Act 1991).
Under existing arrangements in England and Wales the general protection of ani-
mal species is achieved through several separate pieces of legislation.32 The Wildlife
and Countryside Act 1981 (WCA 1981) establishes offences aimed at the protection
of wild animals and in this regard has some overlap with animal welfare. Specifically
Part 1 of the WCA 1981 provides for the protection of birds, as identified in listed
Schedules, by establishing offences concerning the taking or destruction of nests or
eggs and the killing, taking or injury of wild birds. Elsewhere, the WCA provides for
the ‘protection of certain wild mammals’, establishing offences equivalent to those in
Part 1.33 Reflecting historical divisions, the protection of certain wild animals under
section 9 of the WCA 1981 is subject to a number of exclusions including where the
action is taken under specified agriculture or animal health Acts or where it is neces-
sary for the purpose of preventing damage to livestock, foodstuff for livestock, crops,
vegetables, fruit, growing timber or any form of property or fisheries.34 Similar exclu-
sions apply in the Habitats Regulations.
With respect to conservation more broadly, the Natural Environment and Rural
Communities Act 2006 sets out the duty of public authorities to conserve biodiver-
sity; this is pursued through the listing of organisms and habitats which are regarded
as of principal importance.35 The Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations
2010 (the Habitats Regulations) also provide for species protection, implementing
the requirements of the EU Habitats Directive.36 Part 3 of the Habitats
Regulations provides for the protection of species and applies to ‘European protected
species’ which have a natural range in Britain.37 In addition, offences are established
for the protection of certain wild animals, these include European protected species
but also, in some circumstances (deliberately disturbing animals) to any wild
species.38
3 . ADDRESSING DECLINING HONEYBEE POPULATIONS WITHIN
THE CURRENT LEGAL PARADIGMS
This section uses a case study of honeybees to explore the limits of the paradigms
presented in Section 2. The problem of honeybee decline is one which has seen calls
30 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna
and flora [1992] OJ L206/7.
31 Council and Parliament Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds [2009] OJ L20/7.
32 Separate legislation applies to marine and coastal protection.
33 s 9 establishes an offence of intentionally killing, injuring or taking listed wild mammals. See listed ani-
mals in Schedule 5 and see further s 11: prohibition on certain methods of killing or taking wild animals
and s 12: protection of certain mammals.
34 WCA 1981 s 10.
35 Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 ss 40–41.
36 Council Directive 92/43/EEC (n 30).
37 As listed in Schedule 2 of the Regulation. See ss 40–43 on protection of animals.
38 Habitats Regulations, see s 40(1)(a) and (b).
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for an urgent response,39 but in the context of these paradigms it is not clear that the
law is able to respond effectively to this contemporary problem. This section analyses
the application of each of the three paradigms to the honeybee problem and in doing
so identifies some of the key conceptual difficulties that are more broadly applicable
and which are discussed in later sections.
3.1 Honeybees in England and Wales
Bees, including honeybees, are the one of the world’s most important pollinators of
flowering plants,40 and make an important contribution to the provision of pollin-
ation services, which are a key ecosystem service.41 In addition to their inherent value
as a species, including as a component of biodiversity, pollination services provided
by honeybees contribute to plant genetic diversity and to the availability of a number
of agricultural crops, particularly fruits.42 The economic value to UK agriculture of
pollination by honeybees has been estimated at £200m per year.43 Honeybees, of
course, also produce honey and other products such as beeswax; the estimated value
of honey in the UK is between £10 and 35 m, per annum, depending on yield.44 As
well as having economic and ecological value honeybees have with respect to social
amenity, with beekeeping providing a hobby or ‘leisure activity’ to thousands of peo-
ple annually. In England and Wales honeybees also have a social value in so far as
they share (with certain other plants and animals) iconic status in relation to the
English countryside and heritage.45 The economic value of such contributions is of
course difficult to quantify, though perhaps not impossible; work on the assessment
of ecosystem services attempts to make such calculations.46
The majority of honeybees in England and Wales are managed—that is, they are
kept by beekeepers. A small proportion of honeybees are managed on a commercial
39 For example, in the UK the Insect Pollinators Initiative was a £10m joint funding initiative which sought
to address pollinator declines including through funding focused on honey bee pests and diseases. The
initiative was supported by the Biotechnology & Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), the
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra), the Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC), the Wellcome Trust and the Scottish Government.
40 Andrew Cuthbertson and Mike Browne, ‘Issues Affecting British Honeybee Biodiversity and The Need
for Conservation of This Important Ecological Component’ (2009) 6 Int J Environ Sci Tech 695;
Andrew Byrne and Una Fitzpatrick, ‘Bee Conservation Policy At The Global, Regional And National
Levels’ (2009) 40 Apidologie 194.
41 See for instance Joseph Alcamo and others, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: A Framework for
Assessment (Island Press 2003); Claire Kremen, ‘Crop Pollination Services from Wild Bees’, in Rosalind
James and Theresa Pitts-Singer (eds), Bee Pollination in Agricultural Ecosystems (OUP 2008).
42 Alexandra-Maria Klein and others, ‘Importance of Pollinators in Changing Landscapes for World Crops’
(2007) 274 Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 303.
43 National Audit Office & Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); The Health of
Livestock and Honeybees in England, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, (HC 288 Session
2008–2009, 4 March 2009) 12 and Appendix II.
44 National Audit Office & DEFRA, ibid 28.
45 This is recognised by DEFRA, for instance, in DEFRA, Bees and Other Pollinators: their Value and Health
in England. Review of Policy & Evidence (July 2013) and can be witnessed in the wide array of goods and
works which depict the honeybee and beekeeping as part of the British countryside.
46 The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, UK National Ecosystem Assessment, Preliminary Synthesis
and Progress Report on Status and Trends, (Report of the co-chairs February 2010) <http://www.teeb
web.org/> accessed 18 January 2017.
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basis but the majority are managed on both a small-scale and a non-commercial
basis. As will be explored below, the status and legal characterisation of non-
managed bees sometimes breaks down: there are populations of feral bees living wild
(ie living separately from the direct influence or management of a beekeeper) while
the presence of further ‘wild’ honeybee populations is disputed; honeybees are native
to northern Europe, but there is limited data to confirm or disprove the presence or
numbers of wild honeybees.47
Persistent indicators that the numbers of honeybees may be in serious decline are
consequently of concern not only from a conservation perspective but also in terms
of agriculture, food security and the economy.48 In England colony losses of at least
30% were reported for the winters of 2007–2008 and 2012–2013. Although losses in
other years have been less drastic they are significantly higher than the 7–10% con-
sidered sustainable.49 Responding to these losses is challenging because the causes
are not well-understood. A number of factors have been implicated, including the
use of agrochemicals,50 loss of habitat for forage (associated with industrial agricul-
ture and inadequate availability of suitable natural habitat51) and, for honeybees in
47 There is no consensus on the number of honeybees living wild in the UK that may be considered ‘wild’
or ‘feral’. See Ana Nieto and others, European Red List of Bees (Publication Office of the European Union
2014). Nieto and others comment that ‘Numerous studies indicate that A. mellifera has undergone signifi-
cant declines in Europe . . . . however, it is not clear if they refer to population reduction of wild or man-
aged colonies although there are studies clearly documenting shifts in the number of managed hives.’ See
also Catherine Thompson, Giles Budge and Jacobus Biesmeijer, ‘Feral Bees in the UK: The Real Story’
Bee Craft (April 2010) 22.
48 The issue of honeybee losses is subject to focused and on-going research efforts but a number of studies
and reports have indicated a problem of declining populations. See Jefferey Pettis and Keith Delaplane,
‘Coordinated Responses To Honeybee Decline In The USA’ (2010) 41 Apidologie 256; Simon Potts
and others, ‘Declines of Managed HoneyBees and Beekeepers’ (2010) 49 European J of Apicultural
Research 15; Peter Neumann and Norman Carreck, ‘Honeybee Colony Losses’ (2010) 49 J of
Apicultural Research 1; Dennis van Engelsdorp. and Marina Meixner, ‘A Historical Review of Managed
Honeybee Populations In Europe And The United States And The Factors That May Affect Them’
(2010) 103 Journal of Invertebrate Pathology S80; Rene´e Johnson, ‘Honeybee Colony Collapse
Disorder’ Congressional Research Service Report January 7 2010, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/
67531/metadc505392/> accessed 3 March 2017.
49 See The British Beekeepers’ Association, BBKA Members Honey Bee Colony Winter Survival Survey for
2014 /2015, 25 June 2015, <http://www.bbka.org.uk/news_and_events/press_office/press_releases.
php> accessed 3 March 2017. See also The British Beekeepers’ Association, Beekeepers fight back to en-
sure honeybees’ survival, Tuesday 26 May 2010, <http://www.bbka.org.uk/news_and_events/news.
php> accessed 3 March 2017.
50 The use of agrochemicals, in particular neonicitinoids, has also received significant attention as one of the
factors contributing to the decline in honeybees including in a global context. The scientific basis for this
discussion—in which data is contested—and the possibility of banning such pesticides is beyond the
scope of this article since it focuses on issues other than those concerning the regulation of animals. The
European Food Safety Authority distinguishes bee health issues, which are dealt with in the remit of ani-
mal health, from pesticides regulation. See however EFSA Panel on Plant Protection Products and their
Residues (PPR) ‘Scientific Opinion On The Science Behind The Development Of A Risk Assessment Of
Plant Protection Products On Bees (Apis mellifera Bombus spp. and solitary bees)’, 2012 10 EFSA J
2668 and see (n 48).
51 See, for example, Imperial College London Consultants, Honeybee Health (Risks) in England and Wales:
Report to the National Audit Office (2008); Stefano Maini, Piotr Medrzycki and Claudio Porrini, ‘The
Puzzle Of Honey Bee Losses: A Brief Review’ (2010) 63 Bulletin of Insectology 153; Cuthbertson and
Brown (n 40); Laura Hannon and Thomas Sisk, ‘Hedgerows In An Agri-Natural Landscape: Potential
Habitat Value For Native Bees’ (2009) 142 Biological Conservation 2140; And see British Beekeepers
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the UK especially, a decline in the number of beekeepers who play a role in manag-
ing these risks and sustaining populations.52 One factor which is widely recognised
as negatively affecting the health of honeybees and honeybee colonies is the impact
of pests and diseases.53 Corresponding measures are necessary therefore both to pre-
vent the arrival of new pests and diseases and to manage the impact of those that are
already present.
3.2 Honeybees, disease control and the framework for animal health
Given the significance that has been attached to pest and disease risks for declining
honeybee populations, animal health might be the obvious framework through which
to manage honeybee health risks. Within EU law, honeybees do fall within the remit
of the animal health legislation for the purpose of movement into and within the
EU: since there is an international trade in honeybees, they are regulated under the
Balai Directive with requirements in place to prevent the introduction or spread of
notifiable diseases.54 Beyond this however, within the domestic framework (for
England and Wales), honeybees do not fall within the remit of animal health. From a
regulatory perspective they are the responsibility of a separate agency.55 From a legis-
lative perspective, honeybees are subject to standalone legislation in the form of the
Bees Act 1980 (the 1980 Act) and the Bee Diseases and Pests Control (England)
Order 2006 (the 2006 Order).56 Under the bee-specific legislation there are some
notable differences in approach to controlling honeybee disease risks as compared
with those of animals within the animal health framework.
Association, Honeybee Health Research Concepts (2009); Vicky Kindemba, The Impact Of Neonicotinoid
Insecticides On Bumblebees, Honeybees And Other Non-Target Invertebrates (Buglife: the Invertebrate
Conservation Trust 2009).
52 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST), ‘Insect Pollination’ (January 2010) Postnote
348. And see Imperial College London Consultants, ibid.
53 For discussion of the nature of relevant threats, both endemic and exotic, see Imperial College London
Consultants (n 51) 7, and see further British Beekeepers Association (n 51); Ingemar Fries and Suresh
Raina, ‘American Foulbrood and African Honeybees (hymenoptera: apidae)’ (2003) 96 J of Economic
Entomology 6; Stephen Pernal and Adony Melathopoulos, ‘Monitoring for American Foulbrood Spores
from Honey and Bee Samples in Canada’ (2006) 41 Apiacta 99; Selwyn Wilkins, Mike Brown and
Andrew Cuthbertson, ‘The Incidence Of Honeybee Pests And Diseases in England and Wales’ (2007) 63
Pest Management Science 1062; Wolfgang Ritter and Pongthep Akratanakul, Honeybee Diseases And
Pests: A Practical Guide (FAO 2006); Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA), Managing
Varroa (2009).
54 Council Directive 92/65/EEC of 13 July 1992 laying down animal health requirements governing trade
in and imports into the Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not subject to animal health re-
quirements laid down in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A(I) to Directive 90/425/EEC
[1992] OJ L268/54. The Balai Directive sets out animal health requirements for ‘other’ animals (separ-
ately from common livestock animals which are subject to separate legislation). See DEFRA guidance on
the Balai Directive <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/balai-directive-moving-live-animals-semen-and-em
bryos> accessed 18 January 2017.
55 Honeybees were until very recently regulated separately from animal health, within the remit of the Plant,
Seed and Bee Health Inspectorates of the FERA. Plant and animal health has now been brought together
under the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), though specific responsibility for honeybees re-
mains with the National Bee Unit (NBU). See APHA <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
animal-and-plant-health-agency> and National Bee Unit (NBU) <http://www.nationalbeeunit.
com> (both accessed 18 January 2017).
56 SI 2006/342.
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Consideration of the risks posed by diseases of honeybees would appear to sup-
port the need for registration of beekeepers or their hives since by their nature bees
are mobile and movement from one colony to another has seen diseases spread from
one area to another.57 Consequently, in some jurisdictions, such as France and New
Zealand, beekeepers with one or more hives must be registered because of the recog-
nised animal health risks. In England and Wales although legal provisions in the
2006 Order aim to enable containment, treatment or eradication of diseases and
pests, registration of beekeepers is currently voluntary rather than mandatory.58 In
2009, a period of heightened interest in beekeeping, figures reported by the NBU
indicated that around 20,000 beekeepers were not registered.59 This has implications
for surveillance and enforcement since random inspection and enforcement activities
are based on the identification of beekeepers through ‘BeeBase’.60
Similarly, in contrast with most animal health controls, although the 2006 Order
provides for standstill orders in the event that a notifiable pest or disease is con-
firmed,61 there are no provisions establishing routine movement controls for honey-
bees: no system for official notification, exchange of information, use of permits, or
similar, is provided for. Bees may then, ordinarily, be moved freely from one area to
another without that fact being recorded or communicated. Requirements for rou-
tine record keeping are also limited. Article 12 of the 2006 Order implies that there
may be a record keeping obligation on beekeepers, providing that
a person in charge of bees, hives, combs, bee products, or appliances or the
owner or occupier of premises or a vehicle in which there is suspected to be a
notifiable pest shall. . . give such information (including information concern-
ing the number, location and any movements of hives, bees [etc.] to an author-
ised person as that person shall reasonably require for the purposes of the
Order.62
Record keeping is not, however, provided for in the 1980 Act or elsewhere in the
2006 Order. If there is a record keeping requirement in this provision then it is vague
and non-specific. Consequently beekeepers may not be aware of their [possible]
legal responsibilities in this regard and, conversely, the legal basis for enforcement
may be uncertain.
57 For instance, see FERA, Foul Brood Disease of Honeybees and Other Common Brood Disorders (Fera 2009).
58 Despite the recognition that there is a need for increased involvement of beekeepers including through
registration, the Healthy Bees Plan emphasises that this should take place only through voluntary registra-
tion. See DEFRA, Healthy Bees: Protecting and Improving the Health of Honeybees’ (2009) 11.
59 Fera, Healthy Bees Plan – Quarterly Newsletter for all those interested in honeybee health, Issue 1
October 2009 (Fera 2009), <http://www.nationalbeeunit.com/index.cfm?sectionid¼41> accessed 3
March 2017.
60 The NBU uses BeeBase as the means to provide information, training and education to beekeepers and
to increase awareness of the relevant legislation. The BeeBase register is also used to target inspection
and surveillance activities. Beekeepers who are not registered are not subject to random inspections.
61 See art 3 and art 4(1) of the 2006 Order (n 56).
62 ibid art 12(1)(b).
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Where the importation or movement of animal products poses a pest or disease
risk these are also often subject to mandatory animal health controls.63 For honey-
bees, apiary products, primarily in the form of honey, present a recognised risk.64
For this reason husbandry advice is that bees should not be fed on honey from an
unknown source.65 There are controls in place for the importation of honey to be
used exclusively in apiculture.66 Honey for human consumption, on the other hand,
though it may expose bees to risks for example in the packing and movement prior
to retail, is regulated not from an animal health perspective but as a consumer pro-
tection issue.67 This may be because it is not feasible or appropriate, in terms of dis-
ease risk or trade restrictions, to place honey for human consumption under such
control. If this is the case then post-entry controls become important, again to re-
duce the likelihood that honeybees access potentially contaminated honey. To date
however, there are no clear legal requirements related to this responsibility and spe-
cific biosecurity requirements or guidance have not been published.68 More limited
regulatory powers also operate with respect to this aspect of surveillance. In contrast
with the common position in animal health,69 the regulatory agency does not have
powers to routinely enter and inspect honey packing plants and nor does it have
other powers to routinely control disease risks at such plants unless there are reason-
able grounds for suspecting that a notifiable disease is present (which does not
63 For example various legislative instruments (see n 8) establish restrictions on meat and other animal
products and place requirements on slaughterhouses.
64 The Regulatory Impact Assessment for the 2006 Order clearly recognises the risk which bee and hive
products pose (Explanatory Memorandum to The Bee Diseases and Pests Control (England) Order
2006, 2006 No 342, see s 5, <http://www.nationalbeeunit.com/index.cfm?sectionid¼79> accessed 3
March 2017. FERA guidance recognises that certain diseases may also be spread by honey: ‘. . . apiary
proximity to some commercial importers of honey or some sites used for the disposal of used honey bar-
rels could be a risk factor for disease’. FERA, Information Note AFB infection- Analysis of Spread and
Possible Risk Locations’ (2010). See also Dirk de Graaf and others, ‘Influence of the Proximity of
American Foulbrood Cases and Apicultural Management on the Prevalence of Paenibacillus Larvae
Spores in Belgian Honey’ (2001) 32 Apidologie 587; Biosecurity New Zealand, Import Risk Analysis:
Honeybee Products (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Wellington New Zealand 2004), <http://
www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity/risk-analysis/animal> accessed 3 March 2017; Wolfgang Ritter,
‘Early Detection of American Foulbrood by Honey and Wax Analysis’ (2003) 38 Apiacta 125; Ritter and
Akratanakul (n 53); Pernal and Melathopoulos (n 53).
65 FERA, Foul Brood Disease (n 57).
66 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 of 3 October 2002, laying down
health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption [2002] OJ L273/1.
See Chapter IX and Annex I.
67 The Honey (England) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/1348) implement Council Directive 2001/110/EC,
setting out honey specifications and requirements with respect to labelling and sale. Within this frame-
work honey must be accompanied by a Model Health Certificate, the conditions of which address issues
such as compliance with processing and production standards.
68 The 2006 Order (n 56) imposes a very general notification obligation on a person who ‘discovers in the
course of his occupation’ a ‘bee pest that he knows or suspects is a notifiable pest’; see art 3(2). Honey
importers and packers are not subject to any explicit statutory duties with respect to biosecurity under
the honeybee health framework. For instance, there are no obligations related to the disposal or storage
of hive products or their containers. With respect to the bees themselves it has previously been estab-
lished that bees swarming away from their hives and later returning remain the property of the owner so
long as she has the power to pursue them. See Reid (n 26) 17–18.
69 For example for cattle (n 8).
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strictly have to be reported by those handling honey, under section 3 of the 2006
Order).70
As can be seen, there are some important differences in the way that honeybee
disease risks are managed as compared with those of animals within the traditional
animal health paradigm. One implication of this is an increased risk of disease preva-
lence and spread and reduced ability to prevent and control disease and pest out-
breaks. The differing characteristics of honeybees compared with other animals
within the framework appear to have placed them outside of the framework despite
the importance of pest and disease control to honeybee health. Unlike other animals
within the framework honeybees are not, in most cases, commercially managed and
honey production is not an economically significant industry. This predominantly
non-commercial status of beekeepers has been seen as reason to avoid additional
mandatory controls and in particular compulsory registration. Beekeepers were
thought not to support mandatory registration, seeing it as ineffective, unnecessary
or an inappropriate intrusion into a private hobby71 and registration has been con-
sidered to pose an inappropriate regulatory burden on small-scale keepers72 (though
as noted, registration of small scale beekeepers in certain other jurisdictions has been
required).
An additional complication concerning honeybees and the animal health frame-
work concerns the nature of ‘kept’ animals.73 Animal health regulations apply to ani-
mals which are considered ‘kept’; this implies that they are subject to human control
and that the keeper has a large degree of control over the conditions and movement
of their animals.74 Though not commercially managed, most honeybees in England
and Wales are managed by beekeepers and have consequently not been considered
as ‘wild’. These bees are maintained in hives and in this sense may also be viewed as
‘kept’. In comparison with other kept animals however, they are not subject to the
same degree of control since honeybees leave the hive to forage and their move-
ments are in this sense not within the control of the keeper and perhaps not neces-
sarily within their knowledge.75 This makes the application of controls to honeybees
and beekeepers somewhat different from those that may be applied to traditional
livestock animals. A further difficulty is that although the majority of honeybees are
managed, a [presumed to be] small number of honeybees are wild and/or feral and
may have contact with managed honeybees (discussed below), in contrast with the
position for many livestock animals. The presence of ‘feral’ honeybees in the country
70 FERA, Information Note AFB infection (n 64).
71 See for example, Hansard 29 April 2009, Column 255WH <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090429/hallindx/90429-x.htm> accessed 3 March 2017.
72 DEFRA, ‘Healthy Bees’ (n 58).
73 Public guidance from Defra confirms ‘You’re a sheep, goat, pig or deer keeper if you have responsibility
for the day-to-day care and control of these animals. This includes a single animal kept temporarily or as
a pet’, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/guidance-for-keepers-of-sheep-goats-and-pigs> ac-
cessed 18 January 2017.
74 Kept animals can also include companion animals and wild animals kept in captivity.
75 In the UK, Couvillon and others report in their study ‘the mean distance foragers travelled for pollen was
1,074 m, whereas the overall mean distance foragers travelled for nectar was 1,408 m’. See Margaret
Couvillon and others, ‘Honeybee Foraging Distance Depends On Month And Forage Type’ (2015) 46
Apidologie 6.
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has been given as a further argument that a mandatory registration system would be
invalid.
3.3 Bees as pets within the framework for animal welfare
Keeping bees in hives and maintaining their housing and food supply implies an as-
sumption of care and it might then be seen that the primary responsibility for health
and welfare lies with the keeper. If the majority of honeybees are managed on a hob-
byist basis, might they be better understood as pets? In this case, an alternative possi-
bility for regulating honeybee health is within the framework for animal welfare.
Of particular relevance to the identified problems concerning honeybee health,
the duty established under the AWA includes protection of animals(s) from ‘pain,
suffering, injury and disease’.76 This duty to prevent diseases is perhaps wider in
scope than the detailed provisions established within the animal health framework,
but is also less precise. In this case the argument that a regulatory burden should not
be imposed because of the non-commercial nature of beekeeping is not tenable since
regulations are applicable to other animals kept on a similar basis, such as cats and
dogs. The duty of care has been clarified in various codes of practice for common
pets (such as cats and dogs) as well as for some livestock animals.77 Applying this re-
sponsibility to beekeepers could potentially establish a legal requirement to provide
appropriate housing (with respect to hives), to maintain awareness of, and follow,
good husbandry practices to prevent diseases and to act appropriately to treat dis-
eased colonies. Although the AWA is concerned with the welfare of animals at an in-
dividual level, for honeybees the duty with respect to protection from disease could
support colony health.
As noted previously, as well as imposing a duty of care, the Act creates an offence
of causing unnecessary suffering.78 Potentially in this case, maintaining low hus-
bandry standards and not preventing or treating the impact of pests and diseases
could lead to an offence; the fact of disease presence causing animals to suffer is gen-
erally recognised.79 The offence applies only to ‘protected animals’—defined in sec-
tion 2 as those which are
a, Commonly domesticated in the British Islands
b, Under the control of man whether on a permanent or temporary basis or,
76 AWA, s 9(2)(e). See generally AWA section 9: Duty of person responsible for animal to ensure welfare.
77 See for example DEFRA, Code of Practice for the Welfare of Dogs (2009) <https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/publications/code-of-practice-for-the-welfare-of-dogs> and DEFRA, Code of Practice for the Welfare
of Cats (2009) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-practice-for-the-welfare-of-
cats> (both accessed 2 March 2017) . Farm animal welfare is further provided for by the Welfare of
Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2078) made under s 12 of the AWA.
78 AWA, Under s 4(1) a person commits an offence if
(a) an act of his, or a failure of his to act, causes an animal to suffer,
(b) he knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the act, or failure to act, would have that effect
or be likely to do so,
(c) the animal is a protected animal, and
(d) the suffering is unnecessary.
79 This fact is apparent in the AWA. See also McEldowney, Grant and Medley (n 1) ch 11. Clearly though
the presence of the requisite mens rea would be a crucial question in establishing the offence.
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c, Not living in a wild state.
Potentially, honeybees could fall within the scope of ‘protected animals’ bringing
them within the scope of the offence (but see below on the limitations of section
1). Although it may be arguable whether managed honeybees are ‘living in a wild
state’, given their foraging nature,80 it is more straightforward to suggest that man-
aged honeybees are under the control of man, at least on a temporary basis. In a
similar way the section 9 duty is applicable where a person exercises responsibility
for the animals on a permanent or temporary basis.81 Applying the existing criteria
would appear to offer protection to managed bees although, as in animal health,
this is complicated by the fact that honeybees are subject to less control than
other kept animals but at the same time not ‘wild’ in the usual sense (see further
below).82 On the other hand, section 2 might also be applied to feral honeybees
even though these are understood to be living in a wild state. For the purposes of
the AWA, the explanatory notes make clear that, with particular reference to cats
and dogs, the term ‘commonly domesticated’ is intended to include feral animals.
Animals of a commonly domesticated kind are in this context to be considered as
protected animals whether they are under the control of man or not. The notes
further provide:
Kinds of animals which are to be considered commonly domesticated in the
British Islands are those whose collective behaviour, life cycle, or physiology
has been altered as a result of their breeding and living conditions being under
human control, in the British Islands, for multiple generations.83
80 The question of whether they are domesticated may also raise difficulties, with both issues giving rise to
questions about whether the population of honeybees could sustain itself without being managed and
whether honeybees are reliant on beekeepers to meet their needs as, for instance, cats and dogs are. On
this point, Robertson notes that New Zealand has produced legislation that expressly recognises a distinc-
tion between domesticated and feral cats, see Ch 5. It is frequently recognised though that managed colo-
nies are not self-sustaining. Robertson (n 11). See also Nieto and others (n 47). and see (n 82) and
Thompson, Budge and Biesmeijer (n 47).
81 The term ‘protected animals’ does not apply with respect to the duty under s 9. This refers to the duty
owed by the person responsible for those animals which, under s 3, means that they are responsible ‘on a
permanent or temporary basis. A person who owns or is in charge of an animal will be considered to be
responsible for it if they have assumed responsibility for the animal’s day-to-day care or for its care for a
specific purpose’
82 Even in this instance (concerning temporary control) the greater degree of freedom displayed by honey-
bees makes the matter less straightforward than for most companion animals. And see Steele v Rogers
(1912) 76 JP 150 in which the court held that temporary control was not being exercised in the case of a
beached whale attacked with a knife while still alive since control implied more than inability of the ani-
mal to escape.
83 Note 14, Explanatory Notes to the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Feral bees might also be protected animals
for the purpose of this Act if they are interpreted as falling in the definition of ‘Not living in a wild state’.
The Explanatory Notes provide that this term ‘is intended to cover those animals which may have ceased
to be under the control of man, and therefore do not fall within section 2(b), but are not yet living wild,
including (though not limited to) animals which have escaped, for example from a zoo or circus.’ It may
be arguable that feral honeybees are ‘escaped’ in this sense though it is not clear whether they can be con-
sidered as living wild. See also Couvillon and others (n 75).
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The likely application of this is very limited given that it is only the offence and not
the general duty that it would apply to and that this requires the necessary mens rea.
In practice it is unlikely to offer protection to unmanaged, feral honeybees, but the
conceptualisation of domesticated animals within the Act does highlight further the
difficulty of categorising honeybees which arises from their ambiguous positions.
More significant and difficult to establish, would be that the act or omission
caused ‘unnecessary suffering’, a requirement that is central to the more general ap-
plicability of the Act to honeybees. The most immediate limitation with the current
implementation of the Act at all—applicable to both the duty under section 9 and
the offence under section 4—is that while section 1 enables the definition of ‘ani-
mals’ to be extended to include invertebrates (and therefore honeybees) no measure
of this nature has been introduced. Extending the definition would require that the
regulatory authority be satisfied on the basis of scientific evidence that the animal in
question is of a kind that is capable of experiencing pain or suffering.84 In two jointly
heard cases concerning the Hunting Act 2004 the Court of Appeal, while finding
that hunting hares, foxes, deer and mink would impact on their welfare, cited the
finding of the Burns Inquiry that there was a lack of firm scientific evidence to dem-
onstrate this.85 This position is reinforced in the explanatory notes to the AWA
which provide
The Act will apply only to vertebrate animals, as these are currently the only
demonstrably sentient animals. However, section 1(3) makes provision for the
appropriate national authority to extend the Act to cover invertebrates in the
future if they are satisfied on the basis of scientific evidence that these too are
capable of experiencing pain or suffering.86
Relatively recent research has attempted to show that honeybees are capable of expe-
riencing suffering,87 but given the reluctance in law to recognise that several common
mammals have this capacity the prospect of the law being extended in this way ap-
pears limited.
Honeybees again occupy a difficult position with respect to legal categorisation.
Although the non-commercial basis and manner in which most of the UK’s honey-
bees are kept might potentially bring them within the scope of the AWA, with posi-
tive implications for disease prevention and control, and perhaps a more readily
acceptable level of regulatory intervention, they do not easily fit here. As inverte-
brates they have not been included in implementing regulations and the likelihood
84 s.1(4)
85 R (on the application of Countryside Alliance and others) v HM Attorney General and Secretary of State for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and R (on the application of Frances Derwin and others) v HM Attorney
General and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2006] EWCA Civ 817; Lord Burns,
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Hunting with Dogs in England and Wales (HM Stationery Office
2000) ch 5.
86 Note 11, Explanatory Note.
87 Melissa Bateson and others, ‘Agitated Honeybees Exhibit Pessimistic Cognitive Biases’ (2011) 21
Current Biology 1070; Kelsey Horvath and others, ‘Invertebrate Welfare: An Overlooked Issue’ (2013)
49 Annali Dell’istituto Superiore Di Sanita, 9; See also Jason Castro, ‘Do Bees Have Feelings?’ Scientific
American (August 2 2011).
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of their meeting the ‘experiencing suffering’ threshold is questionable. Even if requis-
ite data establishing sentience was accepted it is not entirely clear whether honeybees
could comfortably be incorporated into the framework without making a distinction
between managed and unmanaged bees of questionable usefulness (this in turn raises
questions of the distinction between ‘feral’ and ‘wild’, discussed below).
3.4 Conservation and honeybees as wild animals
The final framework to consider, given the limitations observed in the application of
the animal health and welfare frameworks is that of wildlife and conservation. As a
species suffering diminishing numbers, with populations living wild and given their
role in maintaining healthy ecosystems, it might in some circumstances be appropri-
ate to consider honeybees from a conservation perspective.
Although the majority of honeybees in England and Wales are managed by bee-
keepers, this is not the case for all honeybees: some may be seen as wild or at least
as ‘living wild’ and managed bees have themselves been seen as ‘semi-wild’ or as pos-
sessing characteristics that may distinguish them from other kept animals, potentially
bringing them within the conservation paradigm. At a broader conservation level the
foraging nature of bees means that habitat conservation may be important not only
as a matter for wild bee conservation but also for managed bees.
It can be observed from the outset that there is no provision within the frame-
work of conservation specifically for the protection of honeybees (including from
pests and diseases or specific habitat measures). In the WCA 1981, ‘wild animal’
means any animal which is or was living wild and is therefore unlikely to apply to
managed honeybee colonies, but might apply more widely to unmanaged bees
including, possibly, feral bees.88 The offences in the WCA extend only to the inten-
tional killing, taking or injuring of listed species rather than to broader protections
and honeybees are not included in this list. Within the framework of the CRoWA
2000 the priority terrestrial invertebrate species currently listed for the purpose of
the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (now the post-2010 Biodiversity Framework) in-
cludes a number of bee species but not honeybees.89 The ‘European protected spe-
cies’ listed under the Habitats Regulations does include invertebrates90 but Annex 2
does not include the honeybees (nor any other bee species).
Within this framework honeybees are not afforded ad hoc protection in the same
way as some selected species, such as badgers. They are also excluded from conserva-
tion laws which focus on species prioritised because of their low population levels
and the sustainability of the species. The presence of feral bees is, further, a particular
problem with respect to conservation. A major assessment of the status of bees in
Europe—the ‘European Red List of Bees’—classified the European honeybee as
88 The applicable Schedule 5 includes invertebrates though again not honeybees.
89 Joint Nature Conservation Committee and DEFRA (on behalf of the Four Countries’ Biodiversity
Group), UK Post-2010 Biodiversity Framework, (July 2012), <http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-6189> ac-
cessed 18 January 2017. For lists of priority species and habitats see <http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/page-
5705> accessed 18 January 2017.
90 Specifically Maculinea arion, the Large Blue butterfly.
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‘data deficient’.91 The justification for this, despite the bees having native distribution
throughout much of Europe, was that
it is not known whether the species in Europe currently still occurs in the wild,
due to the introgression of managed and feral colonies with wild colonies and
the fact that the wild population may not be self-sustaining.92
The assessment further notes that some colonies living in the wild cannot be con-
sidered as wild since they may contain species that have escaped from a managed col-
ony. This categorisation implies a distinction between those bees that are ‘living
wild’ and those which are ‘truly wild’. In this case, because their status as ‘wild’ is dis-
puted, honeybees that are not managed and may appear to be living wild are effect-
ively excluded from assessment, even if population numbers for the species would
suggest that conservation efforts are needed. This categorisation of wild/non-wild
honeybees is not however universally accepted: Thompson and others note that:
by contrast [with managed colonies], feral bees live in an unmanaged state so,
like any other wild creature, are subject to natural selection. Bees that are ill-
adapted to local conditions or disease will die out, while those that are well-
adapted will survive.93
This view of feral honeybees as distinct from ‘domesticated’ species potentially sup-
ports a view of all unmanaged bees as ‘wild’.94 The notion that the prevalence of
managed honeybees means that they should be excluded from conservation efforts
because these bees are ‘unnatural’ can also be challenged: first because managed hon-
eybees play an important ecosystem role and, second, because beekeeping itself plays
an important role in safeguarding the species overall.95
4 . PARAMETERS OF THE TRIPARTITE PARADIGM AND
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
As highlighted in the preceding section, the regulation of animals becomes problem-
atic where the animals in question do not fit well into existing frameworks. This sec-
tion further explores the parameters of those frameworks and argues that problems
such as those highlighted can be viewed as a result of the disparities between the his-
torical development of these frameworks and contemporary regulatory challenges. In
animal health it is the commercial significance of animals linked with the historical,
economic and public health focus of disease control measures which determines the
parameters of regulation rather than concern for the impact of disease on animals or
animal populations per se. The traditional priorities of the animal health framework
clearly do not apply to honeybees: although honeybees do make a recognised
91 Nieto and others (n 47).
92 ibid 17.
93 Thompson, Budge and Biesmeijer (n 47).
94 Which would also fit the definition used in the WCA.
95 Rodolfo Jaffe´ and others, ‘Estimating The Density of Honeybee Colonies Across their Natural Range to
Fill the Gap in Pollinator Decline Censuses’ (2010) 24 Conservation Biology 583.
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economic contribution through their pollination role this is indirect, in contrast to
the direct economic relevance of livestock. The non-commercial status of the major-
ity of beekeepers has been seen as a reason to avoid additional mandatory controls
and this perspective is reinforced in the case of several other species. For example,
mandatory controls apply to ‘micro-pigs’ kept as pets, for which a movement licence
is needed in the event that the animals are moved from one area to another and
there is a legal obligation to keep records of the movement of those animals on or
off the registered premises.96 These non-commercially kept micro pigs are distin-
guished from honeybees because of the possibility of spreading diseases to commer-
cially reared pigs.
Somewhat similarly to honeybees, pigeons can also be managed, but maintain
contact with wild pigeons for example where they are kept but released for the pur-
pose of racing. Although these pigeons are not economically significant and are kept
on a relatively small scale, in the same way as honeybees, their regulatory position is
somewhat different again because they can be carriers of paramyxovirus (PPMV), a
notifiable disease which can be introduced to racing pigeons through contact with
wild pigeons. PPMV can in turn be a disease risk for chickens and for this reason pi-
geons, including racing pigeons, are brought directly within the animal health frame-
work through express inclusion within the Poultry (England) Order 2003. This
imposes on keepers some specific record keeping and vaccination requirements as
well as the more general requirements of the Order. It is the implications for chick-
ens, and not pigeons (whether kept as ‘pets’ or wild) which is the focus of these
measures and the basis for inclusion within animal health. In these examples it is the
direct implications for livestock animals that bring the animals into the animal health
framework. Voluntary arrangements are in place for some other animals (for instance
alpacas and chickens) in circumstances where this risk to commercial production is
less of a concern.97
Animal diseases are, though, of much broader concern and the means of control
more complex than this focus suggests. Wild animals have been identified as a major
source of emerging diseases98 and can act as vectors and reservoirs for diseases affect-
ing livestock and human health.99 In this sense animal diseases in wild animals must
be a concern within the conventional priorities for animal health. As has been con-
troversially demonstrated through efforts to control the impact of bovine tubercu-
losis through the control of badgers, the presence of disease in wildlife can have
significant implications for livestock health. Given the emerging nature of this issue
and the reactive nature of the animal health framework efforts to broaden
96 Requirements are summarised in DEFRA guidance, ‘Keeping a Pet or Micropig’ <https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/keeping-a-pet-pig-or-micropig> accessed 18 January 2017.
97 See Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Backyard Poultry in Great Britain: General
Guidance <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/avian-influenza-bird-flu> accessed 03 March 2017.
98 William Karesh and others, ‘Wildlife Trade and Global Disease Emergence’ (2005) 11 Emerging
Infectious Diseases 1000.
99 One of the most prominent and controversial examples of this in the UK is the case for badgers, who act
as a reservoir for bovine tuberculosis. See further Richard Horan and Christopher Wolf, ‘Joint
Management Of Wildlife And Livestock Disease’ (2008) 41 Environmental Research Economics 47;
Peter Daszak, Andrew Cunningham and Alex Hyatt, ‘Anthropogenic Environmental Change And The
Emergence Of Infectious Diseases In Wildlife’ (2001) 78 Acta Tropica 103.
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surveillance or other measures to wild animals have been limited and slow to de-
velop. Disease surveillance in wild animals is undertaken by a patchwork of organisa-
tions and where it does occur surveillance and monitoring is often based upon
voluntary projects and initiatives.100 The framework of animal health has not gener-
ally extended to wildlife and it has no relationship with habitat conservation or the
protection of ecosystem services (which include disease regulation)101 which may
help to manage these risks.
While the animal welfare framework may in some respects be better suited than
animal health to the regulation of managed honeybees, its parameters leave uneven
coverage for honeybees overall which is perhaps untenable given that managed and
unmanaged populations live side by side. More broadly, provision for wild animal
welfare is scant. Whereas wild animals may, at least in some cases, more easily satisfy
the sentience requirement (than honeybees), they will otherwise be excluded be-
cause of the continuing legal distinction between the duties and responsibilities that
are owed to ‘animals’ as distinguished from ‘wild animals’. The question of health
and disease specifically is also linked with animal welfare since the impact of disease
is recognised as having a detrimental impact on welfare.102 The AWA 2006 excludes
animals where they are ‘living wild’. The Department of Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has confirmed that possible future laws or other measures ad-
dressing disease control should only be applicable where there is a threat to native
species—and primarily priority species—at a population level.103 It will not be
applied to prevent suffering of individual animals though this is one of the tenets of
the duty within the AWA (for the animals to which it applies). While the UK is often
recognised as having a progressive attitude to animal welfare104 there are limitations
on how far this extends to wild animals and this is clearly the case where the impact
of diseases is concerned.
In the case of conservation a starting point of utility, seen in the historical devel-
opment of the framework, is problematic for honeybees since they have not been (of
course) subject to hunting, collecting or other types of use that formed the early
basis of protection for some species. The utility of bees as pollinators, more recently
recognised, has not brought them within such measures. This perspective similarly
provides limitations on the protection offered to other wild animals. Schaffner, for in-
stance, highlights this situation for rabbits, in the US context: while companion
100 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology ‘Wildlife Diseases’, Postnote, April 2008, Number 307.
The GB Wildlife Surveillance Partnership includes Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency
(AHVLA), Scottish Agricultural College (SAC), Institute of Zoology (IoZ), the Food and Environment
Research Agency (FERA), the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas), the
Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust (WWT), Natural England (NE) and Forestry Commission (FC) (See fur-
ther <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/wildlife-disease-surveillance-reports-2014> ac-
cessed 03 March 2017 and see Chris Cheffings and Richard Ferris, Wildlife Diseases and Biodiversity
(JNCC 13 D03, Joint Nature Conservation Committee 2013).
101 Alcamo and others (n 41) ch 2.
102 The relevance of disease as a welfare is recognised in the AWA. On the evolution of animal welfare from
prevention of cruelty to a welfare approach see for example Robertson (n 11) ch 5.
103 DEFRA, England Wildlife Health Strategy a strategy for tackling the impacts of wildlife diseases in England
(June 2009).
104 For perspectives from the USA and France see Jean-Marc Neumann, ‘The Legal Status of Animals in
the French Civil Code’ [2005/1] Global J of Animal L and Schaffner (n 15).
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rabbits are afforded protections under anti-cruelty laws, rabbits which are ‘free roam-
ing’ and living wild have very few protections and are addressed by the law primarily
from a resource perspective and with no assumption of sentience.105
The assumption that wild animals be left outside of legal controls unless their re-
lationship with humans is such that responsibilities would arise also has implications
for wild animal conservation and means that a clear understanding of, and distinction
between, those animals that are wild and those that are not, is crucial. A complication
here has been the distinction between animals which are ‘living wild’ and those that
are ‘truly wild’ and the assumption that only ‘truly wild’ populations are to be subject
to conservation efforts. The presence of managed honeybees provides an ‘alternative’
population which has effectively excluded them from the perceived need for wider
conservation efforts. On this basis it is not surprising that there are no provisions ap-
plicable to honeybees but there is also no protection of ‘wild’ honeybees despite the
fact that the population of wild honeybees is recognised as threatened and perhaps
close to extinction.106
The limitations of conservation are reiterated with respect to the question of wild-
life diseases. These pose an important threat to biodiversity but existing legal frame-
works typically offer no clear response to this issue.107 Domestically in England and
Wales (and more widely in the UK) there is no strategic framework for diseases af-
fecting wildlife. Wild animals and diseases of wildlife may be the subject of specific
measures where a risk is posed to livestock or public health108 but there is no overall
legal basis for preventing diseases of wildlife for the sake of species protection or bio-
diversity. Despite the implications for biodiversity and despite the recognised rela-
tionship between disease prevalence and habitat integrity, wildlife diseases are not
addressed at all within conservation laws.109 These laws might become relevant in a
reactive context, if the impact of disease has been sufficient to threaten the popula-
tion numbers of a species which is or becomes prioritised but they offer neither dir-
ect nor preventative protection. The recent Law Commission consultation on
wildlife law noted, with respect to disease control legislation, that the principal focus
here is the protection of agriculture and public health and a review of the relevance
of such measures to wildlife was expressly excluded from the project.110
The presence of feral animal populations further poses difficulties in the context
of the existing frameworks. As noted, for honeybees the presence of feral populations
was seen as a barrier to regulation within animal health and conservation. Similarly,
the position is complicated for wild boar. While commercially kept wild boar fall
within the animal health framework, feral wild boar are not subject to equivalent
105 Schaffner (n 15).
106 Jaffe´ and others (n 95).
107 See Patricia Farnese, ‘The Prevention Imperative: International Health and Environmental Governance
Responses to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases’ (2014) 3 TEL 285.
108 Animal Health Orders, for example, may authorise culling of wildlife where they pose a disease risk to
‘other animals’ as has been the case, for instance with badgers under the The Tuberculosis Eradication
(Wales) Order 2009 (SI 2009/2614). See s 21 of the Animal Health Act 1981.
109 Chomel and others for instance note that conservation of habitats is critical for preventing emergence of
new reservoirs or amplifier species. Bruno Chomel, Albino Belotto and Francois-Xaxier Meslin,
‘Wildlife, Exotic Pets, and Emerging Zoonoses’ (2007) 13 Emerging Infectious Diseases 6.
110 Law Commission, Wildlife Law (2012) (n 15) 1.28 and 1.29.
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disease controls—despite the fact that they can be affected by and transmit endemic
and exotic diseases—because the risk they pose to domestic pigs is considered to be
low.111 While the feral wild boar themselves are not subject to control, their presence
does not impact the requirement that pigs (including boar) be registered (though
the likelihood of kept and feral boar interacting is much less than for honeybees be-
cause of the closer degree of control that kept pigs are subject to). In the framework
of animal health, feral populations complicate the regulatory picture because while
their presence might have implications for the health of kept animals they cannot be
managed in the same way as other farmed animals. At the same time, these popula-
tions may be impacted themselves by animal diseases but are unlikely to be subject
to disease control on this basis.
Feral animals also present difficulties in the context of animal welfare. Whereas
this framework provided opportunities for protection in the case of feral honeybees
the position is not the same for all feral animals. Control of feral wild boar is a matter
for local landowners:112 concerns have been raised about the welfare implications of
shooting feral wild boar but DEFRA guidance confirms that ‘there is no legislative
vehicle under which specific welfare protection for feral wild boar can be introduced’.
By contrast farmed wild boar along with other pigs will attract animal welfare meas-
ures. This raises a tension in the parameters of animal welfare—feral wild boar al-
though related to domesticated species effectively ‘lose’ the protection of animal
welfare because in this context they are ‘living wild’ and the limitations of wild animal
welfare therefore apply.113
The relationship between feral and wild species is problematic in the framework
of conservation because although they are ‘living wild’, feral animals are considered
to be distinct from ‘truly wild’ animals based on the notion that their populations
may not be self-sustaining, descending as they do from domesticated animals. In add-
ition the presence of feral animals has been seen to undermine the conservation of
wild animal populations where interbreeding affects the genetic composition of wild
species. The distinction between feral or other unmanaged populations and those
that are truly wild may not always be easy to establish however and even if it is, the
exclusion of certain populations may not always be straight forward in its conserva-
tion implications. The presence of hybrid animals and their delineation from the
‘truly wild’ animals is another in which the distinctions in conservation can be prob-
lematic. Trouwborst has discussed the complexities surrounding the status of wolf-
dog hybrids within EU and international conservation law.114 Hybrid animals may
pose a threat to wild species but, as examined in the case of wolf-hybrids, are not ex-
plicitly addressed in the relevant conservation laws. In this example, changes to en-
able more effective control of feral animals may be necessary to address the
problems associated with hybrid species but as has been seen in the case of
111 DEFRA, Feral Wild Boar in England: An Action Plan (2008).
112 ibid.
113 But this too points to an internal inconsistency since the description of ‘feral’ in the AWA implies that,
in the narrower context of the s 4 offence, protections may apply.
114 Arie Trouwborst, ‘Exploring the Legal Status of Wolf-Dog Hybrids and Other Dubious Animals:
International and EU Law and the Wildlife Conservation Problem of Hybridisation with Domestic and
Alien Species’ (2014) 23 RECIEL, 111.
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honeybees the issue is slightly different to that of wolf-dog hybrids, involving domes-
ticated populations of the same species. Trouwborst also notes that in certain circum-
stances failing to protect wolf-dog hybrids may undermine the conservation status of
wolves. These issues point to further questions about the definition of wild animals
and what it means to be ‘wild’. As noted by Fitzgerald there can be differing legal,
cultural and scientific perspectives on the terms ‘wild animals’ and ‘wild’ and some
animals may be more readily viewed as wild than others. At the same time the law
must [or ought to] address issues across the whole range of human interests and not
those in only one limited perspective.115
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As has been seen, the parameters of the three main paradigms concerning animals
and the law (specifically in the context of the legal system of England and Wales)
can be problematic and inconsistent when addressing specific regulatory concerns
and species and fail to take into account or respond to modern problems. These
paradigms are based on assumptions and categorisations which are no longer com-
pelling: inconsistencies about the presence of sentience, a too narrow focus on the
nature of health and disease issues, outdated perspectives on the relationship be-
tween humans and wild animals and the true utility of wild animals, and perspectives
on the environment and conservation which do not reflect a contemporary accept-
ance of the interconnectedness of species and the wider role and function of ecosys-
tems and their services.
Limited changes to existing frameworks would help to address difficulties in spe-
cific cases. For honeybees, for example, simple changes such as requiring registration
of hives or beekeepers would facilitate monitoring and disease management in a way
that is more consistent with the approach to disease risks for other animals.
Extending the duty of care within the animal welfare framework would likely have an
impact on the presence of pests and diseases, although the extent of this is question-
able, given the presence of feral and/or wild honeybees.
Both the animal welfare framework and that for conservation could be extended
to accommodate some of the challenges discussed. Given the advances in social atti-
tudes towards animal welfare such as those recognised in the passing and upholding
of the Hunting Act 2004 (albeit, as noted, with some restraints), the wider exclusion
of animals living wild and the provision of only ad hoc protections of wildlife in both
welfare and conservation contexts might be viewed as untenable, particularly given
that this can lead to inconsistencies even within the same species. Similarly, biodiver-
sity plans and legislative provisions could incorporate strategic planning, horizon
scanning, and responsibilities for surveillance and enforcement to tackle wildlife dis-
eases.116 Introducing a legal basis for action where disease poses a threat to species
or biodiversity would be an alternative means of addressing this particular gap and
recognising its wider importance.
115 Fitzgerald (n 13).
116 There is a vast difference here in the importance that has been attached to diseases of wildlife in animals
as compared with those occurring in the framework of plant health, such as ash dieback disease and the
control of oak processionary moth.
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Given the parameters discussed, the possibility of extending these frameworks
turns on legal distinctions such as whether given animals are to be considered ‘wild’.
Here is where changes must go further than extending existing provision to address
the conceptualisation of animals. The assumption that the law should not intervene
with wild animals breaks down when it is recognised that anthropogenic activities are
exposing wild animals to new risks. The notion that wild animals are ‘untouched’
and can be distinguished from those ‘under the control of man’ is stretched in the
modern context: this argument has been made lucidly by Harrop who argues that
increasing urbanisation, changes in land use and the effects of climate change, includ-
ing impacts on ecosystems and habitats, mean that the notion of ‘wild’ is becoming
and will become more difficult to assert.117 In addition, Robertson argues that the
notion that wild animals are not ‘utilised’ in the way that other animals are, overlooks
the fact that ‘modern attitudes usually recognise the value of biodiversity to human
existence and its importance in ecosystem health and other functions which are in-
herently valuable to human existence’.118 The basis for the continued exclusion of
wild animals from measures for animal health and welfare can consequently be ques-
tioned along with the conventional distinction between wild and kept animals.
Domestic law however, has been reluctant to move in this direction. The recent
review of wildlife law undertaken by the Law Commission, for instance, proposed
changes to the WCA which would make it possible to list species in the applicable
Schedules for reasons other than extinction risk, including, for instance, as an essen-
tial component of an ecosystem.119 These changes would go some way to providing
greater protection for animals to be protected on the basis of their ecosystem role.
Nevertheless, the decision to maintain a distinction between wildlife and habitat pro-
tection, with the latter excluded from the review, maintains an unhelpful and imprac-
tical distinction between the protection of wild animals and their habitats. Similarly,
the difficulties concerning the definition of ‘wild’ and the presence of feral animals
were not addressed.
Possibly more straightforward, but narrower in scope, is the option of extending
the existing animal health framework to introduce obligations concerning wild ani-
mal disease. This would extend the framework beyond its traditional boundaries and
would facilitate an approach that on the one hand would recognise the impact of dis-
eases on the health and consequently welfare of wild animals, and on population lev-
els and biodiversity more broadly. On the other hand, it would allow for a more
comprehensive approach to managing diseases relevant to livestock and managed
animals: incorporating regulatory obligations and responsibilities within one frame-
work here would provide an opportunity to act more holistically with respect to the
pathways and vectors for disease including those affecting farmed animals (and in-
deed human health). One of the great challenges here would be in addressing ques-
tions of responsibility, liability and the cost of regulatory action and potential cost
117 Stuart Harrop, ‘Climate change, Conservation and the Place for Wild Animal Welfare in International
Law’ (2011) 23 JEL, 441. With reference to disease, the extent to which wild animals are exposed to dis-
eases, including exotic and emerging diseases, is driven by anthropogenic activity including changes to
land use and increased international trade and travel.
118 Robertson (n 12).
119 Law Commission (n 15) 2.88–2.91.
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sharing arrangements, recognising the public good aspect of effective management of
animal diseases. This broader framework might also accommodate more flexibility in
dealing with those animals occupying more complex, or more ambiguous regulatory
spaces, as in the case of wild boar: bringing all wild boar within the same framework
could potentially allow for more consistent thinking with respect to welfare as well as
in determining the need for, for instance, disease surveillance, on the basis of disease
risk.
A more ambitious project would seek a more comprehensive or holistic approach
in which the implications of given challenges and risks be assessed with respect to
the impact on animals, population levels and in a wider environmental context, for
instance, incorporating ecosystems health. There is, in the modern context, no com-
pelling reason why such an approach should not be pursued. Indeed, it has been
called for in international policy fora and would be beneficial both to the narrower
anthropocentric concerns of the agricultural economy and human health and, to the
protection of animals from a broadly defined welfare and conservation perspective.
One corresponding approach which has gained traction at the international policy
level is the ‘One Health’ approach which seeks to unite veterinary medicine and pub-
lic health as well as wildlife and ecosystems health.120 This approach specifically
addresses problems surrounding health and disease but also demonstrates a way of
responding to a given problem which understands the problem in the context of
interconnected spheres. Despite its emergence at the global policy level domestic law
has not pursued an approach of this type. While the implications of specific issues
such as those concerning honeybees, wild boar, or hybrid wolves may be relatively
constrained, those concerning the failure to tackle animal categorisations in their
modern context and those of emerging challenges such as wildlife disease are of far
reaching significance. Extending existing frameworks, perhaps most practically in the
framework of animal health, would go some way to addressing these issues but to
offer a framework that is broad and comprehensive enough to continue to meet chal-
lenges will require more than this.
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